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Cheney v. Bell Nat'l Life: WIDOW 
DENIED RECOVERY ON ACCIDEN-
TAL DEAm POUCYWHEN 
HUSBAND DIED FROM AIDS 
CONTAMINATED TRANSFUSION. 
In Cheney v. Bell Nat'l Life, 315 Md. 
761, 556 A.2d 1135 (1989), the Coun of 
Appeals of Maryland barred an insured 
widow's recovery under an accidental 
death policy after her husband died of 
AIDS (Acquired Immune DefiCiency Syn-
drome) which he accidentaUycontracted 
from a necessary blood transfusion. The 
coun held that hemophilia was a "sick-
ness or disease" within the meaning of a 
policywbich excluded recovery for death 
by "sickness or disease." Id. at 770, 556 
A.2d at 1140. Thus, the coun deemed 
that accidentally contracting AIDS while 
under medical treatment for a sickness or 
disease such as hemophilia was not the 
type of "accident" contemplated in the 
insurance policy. 
Petitioner is the surviving spouse of 
Anthony Cheney, who suffered from 
hemophilia. While undergoing a treat-
ment for hemophilia, Mr. Cheney re-
ceived a transfusion containing the AIDS 
virus. At the age of24, he died of respira-
tory failure, a direct consequence of the 
AIDS virus. 
When Mr. Cheney died, he and his wife 
jointly held an accidental death policy 
under which the insurance company 
agreed to pay a designated amount in the 
event of the accidental death of either 
pany. Upon Mr. Cheney's death, how-
ever, the insurance company refused 
payment assening that his death was not 
"accidental" as defined in the policy. 
Cheney, 70 Md. App. at 164-65, 520A.2d 
at 403. The policy excluded "any loss 
. . . caused by or resulting from . . . 
sickness or disease or medical or surgical 
treatment therefore (sic) .... " Cheney, 
315 Md. at 763, 556A.2d at 1136. 
Mrs. Cheney filed suit in the Circuit 
Coun for Baltimore City claiming that 
her husband's death was accidental. 
Judge Elsbeth Bothe granted the insur-
ance company's motion for summary 
judgment based on its assenions that Mr. 
Cheney'S death resulted from sickness or 
disease, or from medical treatment. The 
coun of special appeals affirmed, also 
suggesting that no "accident" had oc-
curred within the meaning ofthe policy. 
Id. at 764, 556 A.2d at 1137. 
The coun of appeals began its analysis 
by rejecting the insurance company's 
contention that coverage was excluded 
because death resulted from a sickness or 
disease.Id. (relying on General Account-
ing Co. v. Homely, 109 Md. 93, 99,71 A. 
524 (1908». In GeneralAccounting, the 
coun of appeals held that where death 
resulting from a disease is caused by an 
accident, the accident is the true and 
predominant cause of death. As a result, 
the disease is merely a link in the chain of 
causation. Cheney, 315 Md. at 764,556 
A.2d at 1137. 
The coun of appeals then considered 
whether the insured's death resulted 
from medical treatment for sickness or 
disease. The coun first determined that 
the accidental injury occurred when the 
contaminated blood was injected into 
Mr. Cheney and found unpersuasive Mrs. 
Cheney's argument that the accident 
occurred when the blood was drawn 
from the infected donor. Mrs. Cheney 
reasoned that the accident causing death 
occurred prior to any medical treatment 
for hemophilia. She argued, therefore, 
that the exclusion in the policy did not 
apply.Id. at 766, 556 A.2d at 1138. 
Concluding that death resulted from 
the transfusion, namely, from the medi-
cal treatment for hemophilia, the coun 
was faced with the question of whether 
the insured's hemophilia was a "sickness 
or disease" within the meaning of the 
policy.Id. To determine the meaning of 
the policy, the coun looked to the inten-
tion of the panies which is ascenained 
from the policy as a whole. Under this 
construction, words are accorded their 
usual, ordinary and accepted meaning, 
unless there is evidence to the contrary. 
Id. (relying on Pacific Indem. v. Inter-
state Fire & Casualty, 302 Md. 383, 388, 
488 A.2d 486 (1985». 
The coun found no ambiguity in the 
meaning of the word "disease." The coun 
noted that there was no evidence of any 
contrary or specific meaning and focused 
on the ordinary meaning of the word 
"disease." The coun concluded that 
hemophilia was a "disease" within its 
commonly accepted meaning, and 
within the meaning of the insurance 
policy under which Mr. Cheney was 
covered. Id. at 770, 556A.2d at 1140. Be-
cause Mr. Cheney's death resulted from 
medical treatment for a disease, Mrs. 
Cheney was precluded from receiving 
payment under the policy's exclusionary 
language. 
The coun of appeals concluded that 
the cause of Mr. Cheney'S death was an 
accidental injury. However, because 
hemophilia was a disease within the 
meaning ofthe Cheney's insurance pol-
icy, the injury (receiving AIDS contami-
nated blood) was cause by medical treat-
ment for a disease. Therefore, the acci-
dent was not covered by the accidental 
death policy. Consequently, the coun of 
appeals has narrowly construed the 
meaning of "accidental" in death poli-
cies. As a result, the insurance industry'S 
liability under such policies, specifically 
with regard to AIDS related death, has 
been limited. 
----Eugenia Reed Oshrine 
State v. Gorman: COURT UPHOLDS 
THE USE OF PEREMPTORY 
CHALLENGES TO STRIKE BlACK 
JURORS WHEN mE DEFENDANT IS 
WHITE 
InState v. Gonnan, 315 Md. 402, 554 
A.2d 1203 (1989), the Coun of Appeals 
of Maryland held that the state's exercise 
of peremptory challenges to strike the 
only two black jurors from a jury panel 
was constitutionally permissible when 
the defendant in question was white. 
Gorman, a male caucasian, was con-
victed by a jury in the Circuit Coun for 
Harford County of robbery with a deadly 
weapon and related offenses. During 
voin dire, the prosecution exercised its 
perem ptory challenges to strike the only 
two black veniremen from the panel. 
Gorman was sentenced to life imprison-
ment without parole, pursuant to Mary-
land's recidivist statute. Id. at 404, 554 
A.2d at 1204. 
On appeal, Gorman contended that 
the state's use of peremptory challenges 
to strike the black veniremen from the 
panel constituted a denial of equal pro-
tection in violation of the founeenth 
amendment and a violation of the sixth 
amendment's guarantee of an impanial 
jury. The coun of special appeals af-
firmed his conviction. After the coun of 
appeals denied ceniorari, the Supreme 
Coun of the United States granted Gor-
man's petition for ceniorari. The SUo 
preme Coun vacated the judgment of the 
intermediate appellate coun and re-
manded the case to that coun for recon-
sideration in light of the recent holding 
in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 
(1987). On remand, the coun of special 
appeals reversed, and remanded it for a 
new trial, relying on Batson v. Kentucky, 
476 U.S. 79 (1986), Griffith, and Chew v. 
State, 71 Md. App. 681, 527 A.2d 332, 
cert. granted, 311 Md. 301, 534A.2d 369 
(1987), for its decision. After the coun of 
special appeals denied the state's motion 
for reconsideration, the coun of appeals 
granted both the state's petition and 
Gorman's cross petition for writs of 
ceniorari. Gonnan, 315 Md. at 404-405, 
554 A.2d at 1204. On appeal, the panies 
'stipulated that there were only three 
issues: 
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(1) Did the court of special appeals 
misapply Batson v. Kentucky to the 
circumstances of this case? 
(2) Can Gorman assert a sixth 
amendment claim of fair cross-sec-
tion deprivation in the composition 
of his jury? 
(3) Did the court of special appeals 
err in mandating a new trial? 
[d. at 413-14,554 A.2d at 1208. 
Regarding the first question, the court 
considered the applicability of Batson to 
the facts before it. Batson, which in-
volved the state exercising its peremp-
tory challenges to strike black jurors 
from the trial of a black man, created a 
three-part evidentiary standard that a de-
fendant must meet in order to establish a 
prima facie case of purposeful discrimi-
nation in petit jury selection: 1) defen-
dant must establish that he is a member 
of a cognizable racial group and that the 
prosecution has used peremptory chal-
lenges to strike members of the same race 
from venire; 2) the defendant may rely on 
the fact that peremptory challenges per-
mit discrimination by those who desire to 
discriminate in their selection of a petit 
jury; and 3) defendant must show that 
these facts and any other circumstances 
surrounding the jury selection raise an 
inference that the state used their per-
emptory challenges to strike veniremen 
from the petit jury because of their race. 
[d. at 410, 554 A.2d at 1207 (relying on 
Batson 476 U.S. at 96). 
The Gorman court held that the court 
of special appeals had misapplied the 
Batson standard as that holding did not 
include situations where the jurors 
struck were not the same race as the 
defendant. Gorman, 315 Md. at 414-16, 
554 A.2d at 1208-10. Furthermore, the 
circumstances in Gorman failed to meet 
the first prong of the Batson evidentiary 
standard. Gorman was not a member of 
a cognizable racial group, nor were the 
jurors who were struck the same race as 
Gorman. [d. at 416, 554A.2d at 1209-10. 
Next, the court rejected Gorman's con-
tention that the state's exercise of per-
emptory challenges violated his constitu-
tional right to due process of law. Al-
though Gorman relied on Peters v. Ki/f, 
407 U.S. 493 (1972) for support, the 
court noted that Peters involved due 
process because the jury had been ille-
gally composed, not because of any mis-
use of peremptory challenges. There-
fore, the court concluded that the state's 
use of peremptory challenges in Gor-
man's case did not rise to the level of a 
due process violation. Gorman, 315 Md. 
at 417, 554A.2d at 1210. 
Similarly, the court rejected Gorman's 
sixth amendment claim of fair cross-sec-
tion deprivation; first, because the Bat-
son Court had ignored a similar claim; 
and second, because the later case of 
Lockbartv. McCree, 476U.S. 162 (1986) 
expressly rejected the notion that the fair 
cross-section guarantee of the sixth 
amendment applied to peremptory 
challenges. Gorman at 417-19,554 A.2d 
at 1210-11. 
Regarding the issue of whether the 
lower court erred in mandating a new 
trial, the court stated that the question 
would only arise if in fact Batson applied 
to the facts of Gorman's case. Since the 
court previously determined that Batson 
did not apply, it was not necessary to 
consider the question. [d. at 420, 554 
A.2d at 1211. Thus, the court of appeals 
reversed the decision of the court of 
special appeals, finding no constitu-
tional violations from the state's exercise 
of its peremptory challenges. 
In a lengthy dissent, Judge Eldridge 
opined that the actions of the state in this 
case did constitute a prima facie case of 
purposeful discrimination in violation of 
the equal protection clause, and there-
fore, required the prosecution to pro-
vide an explanation for its conduct. [d. at 
420-23, 554 A.2d at 1212-13. He also 
believed that both Gorman's fourteenth 
amendment due process rights and his 
sixth amendment right to an impartial 
jury had been violated, that the "same 
class" rule (the first step of the Batson 
evidentiary test) was inconsistent with 
equal protection ofthe law (as it applies 
to race discrimination), and that Gorman 
had standing to challenge the racial dis-
crimination in the selection ofthe petit 
jury in his case, based on the rationale of 
Peters [d. at 423-38, 554A.2d at 1213-21. 
In the dissent's view, the state's use of 
peremptory challenges to strike persons 
from a petit jury solely because of their 
race should shift the evidentiary burden 
to the state to prove othetwise. [d. at 438, 
554 A.2d at 1220-21. 
The Gorman decision is Significant as 
it illustrates Maryland's refusal to extend 
the holding of Batson beyond the spe-
cific factual scenario in Batson. The con-
sequences are: 1) the unconditional 
nature of the peremptory challenge as it 
has historically existed is preserved; and 
2) white criminal defendants in Maryland 
are now precluded from asserting dis-
crimination when the state uses its per-
emptory challenges to strike black veni-
remen. Conversely, the state remains 
free to strike blacks from the jury panel in 
any criminal trial where the defendant is 
not black. 
-Gregory}. Swain 
Nelson v. State: TRlALJUDGE'S 
REFUSAL TO ALLOW PRESENTENCE 
INVESTIGATION IN A SERIOUS 
NONCAPITAL CASE, IN TIlE 
ABSENCE OF SOUND REASON, IS 
ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
In Nelson v. State, 315 Md. 62, 553 
A.2d 667 (1989), the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland held that the trial court's re-
fusal to order a presentence investiga-
tion report in a serious noncapital case, 
without giving a sound reason why the 
investigation should not be made, was an 
abuse of discretion. 
The defendant, Michael B. Nelson, was 
convicted of first degree murder in the 
Circuit Court for Baltimore City. Follow-
ing pronouncement of the verdict, Nel-
son requested that the court order a 
presentence investigation under Md. 
Ann. Code art, 41, §4-609 (1986 & Supp. 
1988), before imposing sentence. Al-
though the state had no objection to the 
investigation, the sentencing judge re-
fused. The court's reasoning was that 
such investigations were costly and 
would not be ordered without a showing 
of particular need. 
On the date of the dispoSition, Nelson 
again requested a presentence investiga-
tion, arguing that, because the court has 
the discretion to suspend any part of a life 
sentence, the court was obligated to 
learn as much as possible about the de-
fendant in order to impose a fair sen-
tence. The court again refused and im-
posed a life sentence and two consecu-
tive one-year sentences. The Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland subse-
quently affirmed the judgments and 
sentencing. The only issue before the 
court of appeals was whether the trial 
court erred in refusing to order a presen-
tence investigation. 
The court of appeals began its analysis 
by turning to Md. Ann. Code art. 41, §4-
609(b) which requires agents of the Divi-
sion of Parole and Probation to provide 
the court with presentence reports or 
other investigations in all cases when 
requested by any judge. Section 4-609 
(c)(l) provides: 
Prior to the sentence by the circuit 
court of any county to the jurisdic-
tion of the Division of Correction of 
a defendant convicted of a felony, or 
a misdemeanor which resulted in 
serious physical injury or death to 
the victim, or the referral of any 
defendant to the Patuxent Institu-
tion, a presentence investigation 
shall be completed by the Division 
of Parole and Probation and consid-
ered by the court, unless the court 
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